Southern Business Review
Volume 21

Issue 2

Article 3

October 1995

Stock Price Response to Mutual Fund Managers'
Recommendations in Barron's "Mutual Choice" Column
Robert L. Albert Jr.
Morehead State University

Timothy R. Smaby
Penn State University-Erie

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr
Part of the Business Commons, and the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert, Robert L. Jr. and Smaby, Timothy R. (1995) "Stock Price Response to Mutual Fund Managers'
Recommendations in Barron's "Mutual Choice" Column," Southern Business Review: Vol. 21: Iss. 2, Article
3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/sbr/vol21/iss2/3

This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Southern Business Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@georgiasouthern.edu.

STOCK PRICE RESPONSE TO MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS'
RECOMMENDATIONS IN BARRON'S ''MUTUAL CHOICE" COLUMN
Rober/ L. Alberr, Jr.
Timo1hy R. Smaby
I TRODUCTION
In this paper the authors examine the price and volume response 10 publication of the
investment recommendations of mutual fund managers in the "Mutual Cho ice" column in
Barron's. The purpose is threefold: first , to document the price reaction to a source of secondhand information not previously studied in the literature; second, to ascertain whether informauon
or price pressure effects cause this price reaction; and third, to demonstrate the sensi11vi1y of the
results 10 the choice of a market model estimation period before or after the event day.
Second-hand informallon is distinguished from a pnmary release of informa11on not
previously public; an earnings announcement o r a merger announcement would be a primary
re lease. Second-hand information sources such as the "Mutual Choice" column, as well as the
"Heard on the Street" and "Dartboard" columns in T he Wa ll Street J ournal, are closely followed
by the market. The quesuon of how the market reacts 10 these columns 1s important to both
academic researchers interested in market efficiency and individual investors looking for "hot"
stock ups.
Previous studies have documented evidence that stock prices react 10 the public release of
other sources of second-hand inforniation. For e,ample, the "Heard on the Street" column 1s
perhaps the most closely studied source of second-hand information. It contains opinions and
recommendations of security analysts (both investment advisors and money managers) who
provide information for the column presumably after the opinion has been disseminated to their
clients. Lloyd-Davies and Canes (1978), Syed, Liu, and Smith ( 1989), Liu, Smith, and Syed (1990
and 1992), Beneish ( 1991 ), and Huth and Mans ( 1992) report s1gn1ficant stock price responses
to the pubhcauon of analysts' recommendauons in the column. Barber and Loefner (1993) find
ini11al abnormal returns on the pubhcauon date to security analysts' recommendations in the
''Dartboard" column of T he Wall Street J o urnal. They also document partial pnce reversals in
the days following pubhca11on. Other examples of this type include Lee ( 1986), Pari ( 1987), and
Mathur and Waheed ( 1993). The significant market response to these releases 1s in1eres11ng
because the information is not new. Publication simply releases previously available informauon
10 a wider audience. Lloyd-Davies and Canes ( 1978) suggest that 1f the information 1s released
10 a small and select audience in111ally, not enough investors may act on the recommendauons, and
subsequent pubhcauon to a wider audience will result in a ,tock pnce response
Second-hand information also includes buy and ell recommendauons that investment
advisors supply 10 their paying clients. This type of informa11on release 1s considered secondhand information because analyst recommenda11ons are typicall; ba ed on publ icly available
infomiation. Even so. as Huth and Maris ( 1992) point out, stock prices might still be expected to
react 10 the informauon release 1f analysts have superior forecasung ability or acce% to
infomiation not generally available to the market. For instance, Glascock. Henderson, and Martin
( 1986) document significant positive price reac11on 10 buy recommenda11ons by the brokerage firm
of E. F. Hulton. Stickel (1985) finds that Value Linc Investment S urvey rank changes affect

Southern Business Review

I

I

lo

I

IP

I

I

common stock prices, with changes from rank 2 to rank I having the largest impact on prices.
Copeland and Mayers ( 1982) also observe significant abnormal performance following Value
Line ranking changes using weekly data. Other studies of this type include Bjerring, Lakonishok,
and Vermaelen ( 1983) and Groth, Lewellen, Schlarbaum, and Lease ( 1979).
The revelation of money manager portfolio decisions to a wider audience also constitutes
second-hand information. Barron's "Mutual Choice" column provides a forum in which "selected
fund managers select their favorite stocks," all of which are "buy" recommendations. The column
typically includes historical and forecasted earnings and price data on the highlighted stock,
background information on recent corporate events, as well as the fund manager's investment style
and justification for the selection. Occasionally, the column provides details on the fund manager's
holdings of the selected stock, including purchase prices and dates.
Evidence of a significant stock price response to the "Mutual Choice" columns would not
be inconsistent with the semi-strong form of the efficient market hjpothesis 1f information
gathering and analysis is costly. Grossman and Stiglitz ( 1980) develop a model in which higher
risk-adjusted returns earned by informed traders are exactly offset by expenses incurred in the
information-gathering process. Ippolito ( 1993) argues that the evidence on mutual fund
performance suggests that mutual fund managers do earn excess returns sufficient to offset their
higher expenses, which, he says, is consistent with an efficient market.
lf fund managers are informed traders, the market should react to the public announcement
of their recommendations in the "Mutual Choice" column. Note that the fund managers have an
incentive to release their "private" information to the market subsequent to the purchase of a
security: to earn the abnormal return required as compensation for the informauon-gathering costs.
It may also be important for the managers to provide stock picks that subsequently prove to have
done well, because Barron's provides a "scorecard" of all the selections annually.
The authors find a significant positive event day price and volume reaction to publication
of the stock selections in the "Mutual Choice•· column, and no subsequent price reversal in the
overall sample. The authors find that the pnce and volume responses are positively correlated, and
that partial but not statisucally significant price reversals occur in stocks with high abnormal
trading volume on the event day. Finally, they show that the conclusions from studies of the
market reaction to second-hand informauon releases are sensitive to the choice of a pre- or postevent estimation period.

DATA A D METHODOLOGY
All 193 weekly stock recommendations made m Barron's "Mutual Choice" column between
December 14, 1987, and December 30, 1991, were collected. Each column contained a single
stock recommendation. There were a few weeks over the four-year period in which the column
did not appear. Data were available on the 1993 CRSP NYSE, AMEX and ASDAQ tapes for
181 of these firms. The event day is defined as the issue date of the Barron's 1n which the
"Mutual Choice" column ap~. Barron's is printed on Friday evenings for issue the following
Monday. The delivery day has been Monday unul recently, when delivery on Saturday was made
available to certain subscription customers. In either case. the appropriate event date is Monday
(or the following Tuesday if Monday is a holiday). Event day returns are based on closing prices
from Friday to the following Monday (or Tuesday). Researchers have documented a weekend
effect in which Friday-to-Monday returns are significantly negative. Such an effect would tend
to offset a positive event day price response associated with the "Mutual Choice" column
publication, making II more difficult to detect positive abnormal returns on the event day.
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· a
. A single-index market model is used to estimate the market model para meters d uring
period after the event, as follows:
(1)

where

R,

Rm,
e,

a,, P,

return on security j in time t, t • +51 to +300;
return on the CRSP equally-weighted index in time t;
the regression error in time t;
market model parameters for security j.

Abnom,al returns (A Rs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the event window (ta
-30 tot - +30) are estimated as deviations from predicted returns, as follows.

{aJ

+ fl

J.}J

Rml }

(2)

(J)

where
AR,
CARfl"'

fr,.

p

esumatcd abnormal return for security j in ume t. t - -30 to +30:
estimated cumulative abnormal return for firm J from ume t 1 tot,;
estimated market model coefficients from equau on (I) for security J.

The market model parameters are estJmated over a period ranging from 51 days to 300 days
subsequent to the event date, unlike most previous research of second-hand information releases,
m \\h1ch a pre-event est1mat1on period is used I A post-event estimation period is suggested by
Copeland and Mayers ( I 982) and Stickel ( 1985) to account for sample selection bias in their
studies of Value Line recommendauons. Suckel notes that the Value Line ranking sy,tem tends
to upgrade the rank of firms recently experiencing positive abnormal returns and downgrade the
rank of firms recently c;,.periencing negauve abnormal returns. It 1s likely that the mutual fund
managers interviewed for the " Mutual Chmce" column would C)(hibll a similar tendency to
recommend stocks that have recently e)(pcrienced pos1t1ve abnormal returns. use of ,I pre-event
estimauon period in this case would result 1n an upward-biased estimate of a, from Equation (I)
and downwanl-b1a.sed esumates of abnormal returns (AR, from Equation (2)) in the event period.
Furthermore, as these biases are accumulated to form the CARs. the CAR plot would show a
steady downward drift O\'Cr the event window despite the lack of an; true ,1bnormal returns. The
empirical results discussed below confirm that the choice of a post-event es11ma11on period 1s
valid. 2
The criterion for inclusion m the sample 1s a minimum o f fifty days of returns m the
esumauon pcnod. One firm with fewer than fifty days in the es11ma11on period" as dropped from
the sample, leaving 180 recommendauons. If a firm has no return on any day in the event window
(t•-30 to t• +30). ll 1s dropped from the sample for that day, and the average abnormal returns are
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detennined by the remaining firms. The test statistics for the mean ARs for a single event day are
the standard Z test as described in Brown and Warner ( 1985). The Z s tatistics for mean CARs
reflect the Karafiath and Spencer ( 1991) adjustment for serial correlation in the prediction errors
over multiperiod event windows.

EMPIRICAL RES ULTS
Abnormal Returns
Average abnormal returns for the overal l sample are presented in Table I. Using the postevent estimation period, the authors find a positive response on the event day of 1.70%, which is
significant at the I% level , and a smaller response on day t=+ I of 0 .35%, which is significant at
the 5% level. This is consistent with the magnitude of the event-day response to second-hand
information reported by Liu, Smith, and Syed ( 1990), Glascock, Henderson, and Manin (1986),
and others, but smaller than the "Dartboard" event-day response of 3.53% reported by Barber and
Loeffler (1993). The larger response 10 " Dartboard" recommendations may be the result of the
much larger Wall Street Journal readership and the column's less frequent publication. 3
Table I also gives the average abnormal returns for selected days in the event window based
on the pre-event estimation period. The event day response of 1.54% is still significant at the I%
level but slightly lower than the response using the post-event estimation period.
The average cumulative abnormal returns are shown in Table 2. There is a significant pattern
of positive abnormal returns in the pre-event period using a post-event esumation period. The
CAR from t=-30 to t=-1 is 2.39%, significant at the 5% level. Wnh the pre-event estimation
period, there are no significant abnormal returns in the days prior to the event date (days t=-30 to
I=- I}, but there is a significant reversal in the days following the event (!=+ I to t=+ 30). The CAR
from days t=+ I to 1=+30 is -2.25%, significant at the 5% level.
These results are summarized in Figure I, which graphs the CARs over the event window
using both the pre- and post-event estimation periods. With the post-event estimation period, the
CARs drift slowly upward until the event day, when they spike up and then remain flat for the
following 30 days. This pre-event upward drift is consistent with fund managers recommending
stocks that have recently experienced positive abnormal returns.
With the pre-event estimation period, however, the pattern is much different. The CAR plot
is essentially flat until the event day, when it spikes up; during the following 30 days there is
evidence of a continued downward drift in the CARs. Although not reported here, this drift
continues o ut for 50 days. Because there is no reason to believe that such a downward drift in
abnormal returns should continue for such a long period of time after the publication of the
column, the results with pre-event estimation period are suspect.
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TABLE 1
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR ALL FIRMS BASED ON PRE-EVENT AND
POST-EVENT ESTIMATION PERIODS
Abnonnal rerums (ARs) are averaged across all finns in both samples for each day in the event period
(t . -30 to t - +30; where t = 0 as the issue date). The pre-event estimation period sample (t = -23 1 to
ta-3 l) includes 178 finns, and the post-event estimation period sample (t a +51 to
t o +300) includes 180 firms. Firms must have a minimum of 50 rerums in the estimation period to be
included in the sample. This criterion accounts for the difference in the sample sizes between the pre- and
post-event estimation samples. Z statistics are in parentheses.
Event Day

Pre-Event Estimation Period

Post-Event Estimation Period

-5

-0.0002
(-0.05)

0.0005
(-0.03)

-4

-0.0004
(-0.05)

0.0001
(0.20)

-3

0.0019
(0.97)

0.0026
( 1.69)"

-2

-0.0004
(-0.1 4)

0.0006
(0.27)

-1

-0.0023
(-1.74)"

-0.00 16
(-1.45)

0

0.0154
(10.15)...

0.0170
( 10.59)...

0.0024
( 1.67)'

0.0035
(2. 17)..

2

-0.0008
(-0.99)

0.0007
(-0.06)

3

0.0009
(0.18)

0.0016
(0.78)

4

-0.0023
(-1.49)

-0.0015
(-0.82)

5

-0.0007
(0.24)

0.0004
(0.32)

... Significant at the I% level.
.. Significant at the 5% level.
Significant at the 10% level.
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TA BL E 2
AVERAGE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR ALL FIRMS BASED ON PRE.
EVENT AND POST-EVE T ESTIMATION PERIODS

C-umulauve abnonnal returns for each firm are averaged across all firms Z statistics are in parentheses
and reflect the Karafiath and Spencer ( 199 1) adJUSlment for serial correlauon in the abnonnal rerums.
The pre-event estimation period sample (1 • -231 10 l=-31) includes 178 firms, and the post-evem
estimation period sample (t = +5 I 10 I = +300) includes 180 firms.
Event Period

Pre-Event Estimation Period

Post-Event Estimation Period

-30 I0- 1

0.0014

0.0239

0

0.0154
( 10.15)' ""

0.0170
( I0.59)"""

I 1030

-0.0225
(-2.15)°"

0.0037
(0.43)

... Significant a1 the I% level.
.. Significant al the 5% level.
• Significant al the 10% level.

FIGURE I
AVERAGE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURNS FOR ALL FIRMS BASED ON PREEVE T AND POST-EVE T ESTIMATION PERIODS
The cumulative abnonnal returns for each firm are averaged across all firms over the event period from
t = -3010 t = +30. These average CARs are computed using both a pre-event estimation period (t -231
to t= -31) and a post-event estimation period (t = +5 I to t= +300) .
• •1
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Information Versus Price Pressure Effects
The significant positive market response documented in the previous section may be the
result of either a permanent information effect or a temporary price pressure effect. A useful
comparison is found in the empirical literature on the market response to stocks added to the S&P
500 as studied by Hams and Gurel ( 1986). They find a significant positive event-day response and
a subsequent reversal over the following two weeks in a pattern that is very similar to the CAR
plot in Figure I with the pre-event estimation period. Because the announcement of the addition
of a stock to the S&P 500 index is not likely to convey new information to the market, they
auribute the response to temporary price pressure effects as index mutual funds add the new
secunty to the1T ponfo lios. Pnce pressure effects result because it 1s assumed that, while the longterm demand curve 1s perfectly elastic (as is the case in an efficient market), short-term demand
may be less than perfectly elastic because of liquidity effects.
Sirrularly, the observed pnce response to the '"Mutual Choice" column may also be the result
of temporary pnce pressure effects, rather than a permanent information effect, as naive noise
traders rush out to purchase shares in securities featured in the column. The pnce pressure
hypothesis makes two predictions. First, 11 predicts that the initial pos1t1ve response will be
reversed in the following pcnod, and second, that the 1mt1al response and subsequent reversal will
be larger for secunues expenencing abnormally high trading volume on the event day. Barber and
Loefner ( 1993) document a large positive reaction and a subsequent significant partial price
reversal to analyst recommendations in the "Dartboard" column in The Wall Street J o urnal.
They attnbute this pamal reversal to price pressure effects because they find the largest reversal
in those stocks with significant abnormal trading volume on the event day and the following day.
However. as noted above, u-;e of a pre-event esumat1on penod in cases in which stocks expenence
positive abnormal returns may incorrectly suggest a price reversal. Therefore, drawing conclu\lons
on the causes of observed pnce reactions to second-hand information releases is sensitive to the
choice of est1ma11on penod.
The mean-adJusted volume model outlined in the Appendix 1s used to estimate average
abnormal volume during the event "indow w1th a post-event est1mauon period The results for
ctiys t=-5 to 1- +S arc reported in Table 3. Mean abnormal volume 1s s1gmfican1I:,, pos11ive on the
publication day but not significantly positive on any other day in tlus 11\lerval. although 11 1s
marginally significantly negauve on the day before publication (t--1 ).4 fl appears that publication
of the analysts' recommcnda11on, 1s associated w11h an increase m trading volume on the
publication date. W11h a pre-event est1mat1on penod, mean abnormal volume 1s sign1hcantly
different from zero on the event day and the tollo" mg three days (tcO to t-+3).
The authors par1111011 their sample into quartiles on the basis of each firm's estimated
abnormal trading volume on the event day The authors use quartiles to mamtain a reasonable
subsample size of 45 firms. Quartile I includes firms with the highest abnormal trading volume
on the event date, quarule 2 includes those firms with the second highest abnormal trading volume
on the event date, and so on. The average abnormal returns for all fim1s and each of the four
quarules arc reported m Table 4. The ARs for the total sample are repeated from Table I for direct
companson to the quartile samples.

Southern Bu1i11ess Re1•1ew

-7-

---

TABLE3
MEAN ABNORMAL VOLUME FOR SAMPLE OF ALL FIRMS

Mean abnormal volume around the publ ication date is estimated for 180 firms in the pre-event
estimation period sample and 180 firms in the post-event estimation period sample. Volume is
calculated as the ratio of the log of dollar trading volume to the log of market value of shares
outstanding. Abnormal volume is measured using a mean-adjusted model of trading volume with
an estimation period from t=-230 to t--3 1 for the pre-event estimation sample and t=5 l to t•300
for the post-event estimation sample.
Event

Pre-Event Estima tion Period

Post-Event Estimation Period

-5

0.0037
(0.76)

-0.0049

-4

0.0044
(0.88)

-0.0053
(-1.24)

-3

0.0068
( 1.38)

-0.0020
(-0.47)

-2

0.0051
(1.03)

-0.0046
(-1.08)

-1

0.0016
(0.32)

-0.0071
(-1.66)'

0

0.0214
(4.33)' ..

0.0 134
(3. 13)' ..

0.0122
(2.47)'"

0.0037
(0.87)

2

0.0139
(2.82)' ..

0.0062
( 1.46)

3

0.0135
(2.73)' ..

0.0052
( 1.23)

4

0.0085
(1.71)

-0.0010
(-0.24)

5

0.0047
(0.96)

-0.0041
(-0.97)

Day

(- 1.14)

···Significant at the I% level.
·· Significant at the 5% level.
· Significant at the I 0% level.
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TABLE 4
AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETUR S FOR SAMPLES BASED ON POST-EVENT
ESTIMATION PERIOD
Abnonnal returns (ARs} are averaged across aU firms in each sample for each day in the event period
(t = -30 to t = +30 ; with t = 0 as the issue date}. The total sample consists of all 180 firms. Q RT
1 is that quartile of fmns from the Toial Sample that had the highest abnormal trading volume on the
event day. QRT 2 is that quartile o f firms with the second highest abnormal trading volume on the
event day, etc. Z slatistics are in parentheses.

Event Day

T otal Sample

QRTl

QRT2

QRT3

QRT4

-5

0.0005
(-0.03)

0.0009
(0.3 1)

-0.001 9
(-1.06)

0.0009
(0.20)

0.0020
(0.50)

-4

0.0001
(0.20)

-0.0052
(-0.96)

-0.0023
(-0.97)

0.0052
( 1.32)

0.002 1
(1.02)

.3

0.0026
(1.69)'

-0.001 I
(-0.43)

0.0020
(0.49)

0.0045
( 1.71)'

0.0049
( 1.63)

-2

0.0006
(0.27)

0.0064
(1.80)'

-0.001I
(-0.77)

-0.0018
(·0.27)

-0.0013
(-0.24)

.)

-0.0016
(-1.45)

-0.0003
(-0.26)

-0.0013
(·l.09)

0.0007
(0.30)

-0.0057
(-1.86)'

0

0.0170
( 10.59)" ..

0.0326
(10.44)' ..

0.0106
(3.7 1)' ..

0.0172
(4.78)''"

0.0070
(2.15)"

0.0035
(2.17)''

0.0055
( I 90)'

0.0053
(1.91)"

0.0013
(0.28)

0.0020
(0.23)

2

0.0007
(·0.06)

0.0019
(0 16)

-0.0018
(-1.01)

0.0018
(0.75)

0.0010
(-0.0 1)

3

00016
(0.78)

0.0029
(1. 16)

-0.0009
(-0.55)

0.0062
(1.17)

-0.0019
(-0.24)

4

-0.0015
(-082)

-0.0060
(-1.70)'

-0.0010
(·0.26)

-0.0014
(-0.38)

0.0025
(0.71)

5

0.0004
(0.32)

-0.0028
(-1.37)

0.0018
(0.67)

0.0007
(0.20)

0.0020
(1.15)

... S1gnifican1 at the I% level.
:· S ignificant at the 5% level
Significant at the JO% level.
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Theevent-<lay responses for Quartiles I through 4, respectively, arc 3.26%, 1.06%, 1.72% (each
significant a1!he 1% level), and 0.70% (significant at the 5% level). Quartiles I and 2 also experience
statistically significant price responses on day t=+ I of 0.55% and 0.53%. respectively_
In order to test whether price response and trading volume are positively related, event day
abnormal relUITls are regressed on event day abnormal volumes. The results are reported in Table 5_ The
slope coefficient is estimated to be 0.2022 (t = 4.55). which is significant at the I% level.
The average cumulative abnormal returns for all finns as well as for each of the four quartiles are
reponed in Table 6. The CARs from t=-30 10 I=- I for Quartiles I 10 4 are, respectively, 3.36%, 2.29%
1.42%, and 2.46%. Only !he CARs for Quartile I are s1aus11cally significant at the I% or 5% levels. The
post-event CARs (days l=+I 10 1=+30) are nega11ve tor Quartiles I and 2 (-1.78% and -0.84%,
respectively) and positive for Quartiles 3 and 4 (2.74% and 1.42%. respectively). While this suggests
evidence of a price reversal in the high-volume quar11les but not the low-volume quartiles. only the
CARs for Quartile 3 are s1a1is1ically significant a1 even the 10% level

TABLE 5
REGRESSION OF EVE T DAY ABNORMAL RETURi'I ON EVE T DAY ABNORMAL
VOLUME

Event day abnormal volume for each firm is es11ma1ed from equation (3) in the Appendix. Abnormal
returns are es11ma1ed from a market model regression using a pos1-even1 es1ima1ion period. The
regression equa110n is as follows:

Variable

Coefficient

tandard Error

T-Stalistic

ln1ercep1(o:)

0.0143

0.0022

6.42"""

Slope(~)

0.2022

0.0444

4.ss···

R'
10.43%

... S1gmfican1 a1 !he I% level
" Sigmfican1 a1 the 5% level.
• Significant a11he 10% level
The results lend 10 support the inforrna11on hypo1hes1s. There 1s no reversal in 1he overall sample,
which is cons1s1en1 with an information effect, bu1 abnormal returns and trading volume are posiuvely
correl:;led, which 1sconsislent with a pnce pressure effect However. Hol1hauscn and Verrecchia (1990)
developed a rational expec1a11ons model, which predicts 1ha11he variance of pnce changes and trading
volume lend 10 be positively correlated when 1he informedness effect of infonna11on releases dominates
the consensus effec1. In add111on, even though a partial reversal 1s seen in those firms with 1he largest
event-<lay abnormal trading volume, these reversals are no1 statistically significanl.
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TABLE6
AVERAGE C MULATIVE AB ORMAL RETUR
BA ED O POST-EVENT
E TIMATIO PERIOD
Cumulative abnonnal returm fore.ich tinn are averaged across all 180 !inns (All Finns); 1he \Ub-samplc
of firm s w11h 1hc h1ghes1 abnonnal event day 1rading volume (QRT I ). 1he second highe\l abnonnal
event day 1radmg volume (QRT 2). e1c Z sta11s1ics are m parentheo;es and reflect 1he Karafia1h and
Spencer ( 1991) adjw,1men1 for scnal correlat1on m the abnonnal reiums.
Evenl
Period

Total Sample

QRT I

QRT2

QRT3

QRT4

-3010 -1

0.0239
(2.21 >"

0.0136
(1.91>'

0.0229
(1.16)'

0.0142
(0.07)

0.0246
(1.55)

0

0.0170
(10.59)'"

0.0326
( 10.44)'"

0.0106
(3.7 1)'"

(4 78)'"

0.0172

0.0070
(2.15)''

I 10 30

0.0037
(0.4l)

-0.0 178
( 0.99)

-0.0084
( 121)

0 .0274
( 1.65>'

0.0142
(146)

... S1gmhcant al 1he I 'c le,el.
" S1gmtican1 al the Yo le\el.
S1gmlica111 at 1he 10':c level.

The ,tuthor, !ind a s1gmhc,1nt evem-day price reacuon of I 70"r to mutual lund manager\' \lock
rec ,mmenJalmn, m the · \lu1ual Choice" column ot Barron',. anJ no pnce reversal m the o,erall
,ample Thi, evidence 1, rnnsi,tc111 w11h 1he hypo1hcsl\ tha1 1hcse release, arc mlormau,e. The)
J,,cument p.1mal pnce re,ersaJ.. m ,1<><.k, th.II e~pcnenceJ l.1rge abnormal 1raJmg volume on the event
day, wluch 1SC<>nw,tc111 w11h a pncc pressure ettc,·1. 1hough 1hese results are not ,1,111,11c,1ll} S1gmlicant.
These re,uh, sugge,11h,11 .1 po,1-e,em e\11ma11on pcno<l m ,1uJie, ol second-hand mlormauon
release, I\ appn>pria1e because recommended ,1,x:i.., .ire ltkel) I<' ha,e expcnenccJ ahnorm,11 p,1S1l1ve
return, m 1hc pcm,J pnor m 1he mlonnauon release . U,e nl a pre-eve111 es11ma11nn pcnoJ a, lhc
bcnchm.u-k m th1sc.1.sc would resuh m Jowm,ard-b1a,eJ atmormal rc1ums m the e,em wmdow, leading
10 a ,mailer event day response and a downward Jnlt 10 1he average CAR, al1er 1hc event
\PPENDI\.

\lcan-.\dju,1cd ~lodeI of Tradini: \ olume
AJml-.}a anJ Jam ( 19K9) show tha1 a mean-adJus1eJ m,,Jel has almost a, much power 10 Je1cc1
excess volume tor a one-Jay cvcnl pcmld a, a more soph1,11ca1cJ marl-.e1 m<ldcl 1ha1 accoums tor ,enal
corrd,111on m 1he e,ce,, ,otume ,ene,.
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Volume for firm i on day t is defined as follows:

ln( I

+

n;, p,,)

(4)

ln( I + S,, P, ,)

where
n.,
p.,

s,,
I

--

number of firm i shares traded on day t.
price per share for firm i on day t.
number of shares outstanding for firm , on day t.
I,... ,I (number of firms).

v measures the proponion of a firm's total shares outstanding traded on a given day. AJinkya and Jain
( 1989) suggest a log transformation of the volume data in order 10 approxunate a normal distribution.
Expected trading volume for each firm is estimated by calcula11ng average trading volume over
the estimation period:
·
£(V,)

( I / 250)

·300

L

, . •SI

v,,

- I , •••• /

(5)

where tis defined relative to the event date with 1=0 on the event date Abnormal trading volume during
the event penod for firm ion day I is then the actual trading volume for firm , on day t less expected
trading volume for firm i

AV,,

V,,

E(V,)

(6)

The test statistic for any day tin the event windows 1s given by

AV,
S(AV,)

(7)

where
I,

AV, (III,)L AV,,

(8)

;• I

I,= number of firms on day t for which excess volume data are available.

S(AV,)

AV

•300

L

,. ·51

(

•300

L

I•
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•51

(AV, AV)2 / 250

AV,)/ 250

(9)

(10)
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The model is similar to the traditional mean-adjusted returns model used to detect abnormal returns in
event studies.

E DNOTES
' Beneish (l991) uses an estimation period "around" the event date. It extends from t • -180
to t•-31 and from t~+3 I tot•+ I 80.
2

A post-event esumat1on period 1s sometimes also used in event studies If the event is assumed to
cause a change m systematic risk. Such a shift would result in a biased p from Equation (I). However.
there 1s no reason to believe a pnon that inclusion in the " Mutual Choice" column would change the
systematic risk of a firm.
' According to the Dow Jones, Inc. Investor Relations Depanment, circulation for The Wall treet
J ournal was 1,852,967 as of 3. 31 93. Circulation for Barron's wa~ 235,050 as of 12/3 J192.
'Barber and Loeffler (I 993) and Liu, Smuh. and Syed ( I 990) document increased trading volume
around the release date of second-hand informauon.
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